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Foreword
The thirty-fourth Dana Boardman Lecture of Christian Ethics
at the University of Pennsylvania was delivered by the Rt. Revd.
Lord Robert Runcie, Retired Archbishop of Canterbury. Archbishop Runcie's presentation represents well his interest in
and experience of the complex intersection between religion
and world events. Both his honest consideration of the difficult
history of the Christian Church, and his call to greater
understanding of other religions reflect his long work with and
commitment to these issues. His refusal to simplify the problems tied to religion is characteristic both of his efforts to find
real solutions to world problems and his intellectual rigor.
Archbishop Runcie is an academic, religious leader, and international advocate for peace and understanding among people
of different cultures and religions. He has taught both Classics
and Church History and continues to do research in these areas.
As Bishop of St. Albans and Archbishop of Canterbury he traveled extensively and participated in many ecumenical discussions. He is a founding member of The Religious Forum for
Global Survival. In addition, as the leader of the diverse and
fractious Anglican community, Archbishop Runcie's own
mediating skills have been tested: among other duties, he
presided successfully over the difficult Lambeth conference
in 1988 at which social issues were hotly debated. Recently,
he has continued his commitment to the study of many religions
by becoming an ambassador for the Centre for Advanced
Religious and Theological Studies at Cambridge University. He
participates in several organizations devoted to social issues,
such as international aid and development, and the Church's
activity in inner cities.

I would like to thank Professor E. Ann Matter for her assistance
in preparing this publication.
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During the 1939145 War I was a combatant soldier in north-west
Europe. When it ended I was attached as a young staff officer to
the Four Party Italo-Yogoslav Boundary Commission. Our task
was to draw boundaries between Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia.
The American delegation was led by an ethnic expert. There was
a French delegation led by a diplomat and an economist. The
Russians were led by a good party politician. The British had a
lawyer who had never been to that part of the world but knew
how to ask pertinent questions. It was my first introduction to
official diplomacy. I was completely fascinated by it. I
postponed my return to Oxford to complete my undergraduate
education in order to see it through. We toured around the
border lands and discovered what language people used at home
or in school or at church - whether Serbo-Croat, Slovene or
Italian, what customs and attitudes flavored their lives.
Being young I was inclined to be cynical. It seemed to me that
each delegation knew the line which it intended to draw before it
listened to any evidence. I was perhaps over critical; for this was
one of the few major border disputes that has been settled
amicably by compromise between the nations. So far, this has
been one corner of the ghastly mess which was once Yugoslavia
which has not produced major conflict. However, one criticism
which I felt even then and which still has force is that none of
the delegations knew much about religion. Without a sense of
history and religion, it was difficult to understand the passions
of the people whose destiny we were ordering. It was a huge
influence on all the parties to the conflict. Perhaps the all-toocontemporary awfulness of Fascism, and the growing threat of
Stalinist Communism, provided a misleading alibi for
interpreting the terrible things which were still happening in the
region. There was more to it than that, as we have now realized.
Last year in Cyprus I met a Serbian bishop. I have known him
for many years. He is a saintly pastor, and a dedicated patriot.
"We lived under the Muslims for 300 years", he said; "they must
never be allowed to get a foot-hold in Europe again. That is what
we are fighting for. Why do you not understand?" quote that

annihilate the other. So Christianity developed the language of
Crusade, Islam speaks of Jihad, and classical Marxism envisages
history as the struggle of classes. But what are we to make of
life-and-death struggles within Christianity, the religion of love
and forgiveness? To begin to understand these, we need to
realize just how deep-rooted is the conflict within Christianity
between the particular or the local and the universal. We will
need to go right back to the beginnings of the dhristian Church.
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Christianity is a self-proclaimed universalist religion. It began as
a rebellious offshoot of Judaism, a faith which had a complex
attitude to its place in the world. Certainly the Jewish people did
proclaim their particular separateness and uniquely privileged
place in the eyes of God; yet they did so in order to proclaim the
good news of God to the whole world. Judaism had messages for
all people: its prophets Amos, Hosea and Isaiah preached that all
slaves should be freed, not just Jewish slaves, and that the one
God was the God of all. So Judaism's unique privilege and its
difference came to be seen as its teaching role for the world: an
obligation to act morally, to be a light to the nations.
L

The form of Christianity which became dominant took this
universalist message and transformed it: that is why it broke
with its Jewish parent. Here I am on delicate ground, because so
often Christians have caricatured Judaism in the age of Jesus
Christ in order to justify how Christianity developed. Perhaps I
should describe what happened simply in terms of what the early
Christians thought that they were doing. They saw themselves as
pulling down barriers built around Judaism: barriers which for
many first-century Jews were precisely what symbolized their
teaching role for the world. Notoriously, the best-known
spokesman for this transformation, Paul of Tarsus, repeatedly
proclaimed that in Christ there is no difference between Jew and
Greek. He extended this list in his epistle to the Galatians into a
three-fold abolition: no difference between Jew and Greek, slave
-. -.
,:
and free, male and female.
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The Galatians message lies like a ticking bomb at the base of
every clerical or social structure. It says, "when Adam delved
and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?' It says, as Jesus
challenged to a young man of wealth, "give away all you have
and follow me". It says what the Grand Inquisitor says to Christ
in The Brothers Karamazov. In other words, the institutional
Church stands on a seething and unstable core of love and
.
equality.
However, the intellectual afterlife of this passage of Galatians is
significant. In the first place, it was the vision of a man who was
convinced that the Roman world which he knew was about to
shrivel up and be replaced by the kingdom of Christ. The
abolition of difference would be the central characteristic of this
new order of existence. The Galatians proclamation was so
radical as to relate very imperfectly to the everyday world of the
first-century Roman Empire. In the Pauline tradition, it stands
alongside what appears to be a directly contradictory line of
rhetoric: wives obey your husbands, slaves obey your masters,
children obey your parents. This second list was a code for a
world in which the Last Judgment did not in the event come
quickly, and it was this formula which set the norms of Christian
practice, which were not especially different from the norms of
the society round about it. Far from challenging the status quo in
everyday life, Pauline Christianity rapidly became ready to
reinforce it.
Therefore the abolition of difference between Jew and Greek,
slave and free, male and female was of strictly limited everyday
significance. If the Galatians proclamation did have an
immediate practical relevance, it was largely through its first
clause: no difference between Jew and Greek. This was
important because it touched on the basic Christian revolt from
Jewish identity. Apart from that, Paul's proclamation was not
taken as a practical program of action. Its reference was to the
spiritual relationships in the world. Only gradually has it taken
on new resonances for everyday society, resonances which the
early Christians did not hear. Only in the eighteenth century did

Western Christianity begin its wholehearted commitment to the
abolition of slavery worldwide, and in the United Sates, you
hardly need me to tell you how bitter a struggle it was to
establish this idea as normative. Now in the twentieth, we are
beginning to explore how the third clause might cause a similar
transformation in the relationships between the sexes; and the
struggle is again a bitter and painful one.
To say that in Christ there was neither Jew nor Greek did have a
further practical significance in the late first century of the
Common Era. Even if after it had done its work of separating
Christianity from Judaism, the statement seemed to describe the
Christian Church as it was: It was fairly culturally homogenous
body, a fusion of a Greek with a Jewish heritage. In terms of
ideas, Christianity very quickly became concerned with oneness.
Christians argued fiercely about the boundaries of their faith,
and the Christians who won these arguments were those who
wished to impose unity and uniformity on the Christian
proclamation: they called the Christianity which resulted
"universal", or in Greek Katholikos. So Christian universality
now had two aspects: unlike Judaism, it was a religion selfconsciously available to all without qualification, yet it was also
universal because it was the same everywhere.
The Christians of Paul's successor-church were therefore one in
their culture. Characteristically they were urban people who
spoke a form of workaday Greek which was the common
language of trading people in cities all round the Mediterranean.
Even in Rome, most Christians seem to have spoken this Greek
rather than Latin for a century or so after Paul's death. But after
that came the first of Christianity's cultural divides. Christianity
began capturing the allegiance of the aristocracy and
administrative class in the Western Empire. This meant that its
western identity became increasingly Latin-speaking; and that
would have profound consequences for its future. The split
between Latin West and Greek East was given a political
reinforcement in the late third century when the Empire itself
was officially divided for administrative purposes between west

one of the reasons for the rapid Islamic success when Islamic
armies attacked the Byzantine Empire, was that many such
alienated Christian groups welcomed the invaders as liberators
from the official imperial Church which they hated.
Semitic-speaking Christians did not want their doctrines to be
shaped to fit Greek philosophical exactitude. The statement of
Mohammed that Christians and Jews had complicated the simple
message of Abraham and Jesus appealed to them.
Let us recap this lightning survey of the first six centuries of
Christian history. We have seen a faith develop which certainly
had a commitment to universalism: openness to all, and oneness
in belief. Probably that is one reason why fourth-century
emperors allied with it, seeing these universal claims as a
potential source of unity, keeping together their huge territories.
Yet this faith had also become one of cultural and political
divisions. Versions of it had already become identified with
cultural and linguistic groupings and these divisions eventually
helped to pull the Roman Empire apart.

In the West from the fifth century, a new sort of universality
would succeed to that of the fallen Western Empire, and it was
universally identified with the Catholic Church. Partly this was
faute de mieux. When the structures of the Empire disappeared,
often there was no vehicle left to represent the old culture or
give it coherence other than the church. Bishops and their clergy
functioned in some sense like the last surviving wing of the
Roman imperial service. This was a recurrent feature of the
centuries which followed; whenever alternative power structures
faltered and decayed, the Church asserted its everyday power in
everyday society. One of the most remarkable developments of
the tenth century was the concept of the peace or the truce of
God, which developed in France where the monarchy had
virtually collapsed into anarchy. Thereafter the peace of God
ideal was to be found in parts of Europe where the same political
circumstances aiose. In the middle of chaos, bishops of the
Church met in council and declared that Christians should never

kill Christians. They gave their reason in a very basic theological
analogy: "For no one doubts that to kill a Christian is to shed the
blood of Christ."
It was impossible for bishops to suppress violence; it was built
into the society of their day. But they could extend peace as far
as they could. They protected certain places and people forbidding warriors to storm and plunder churches, attack
helpless peasants and merchants, for instance. Another approach
to the truce of God was to forbid violence on the most holy days
of the year: Easter for instance, or even every Sunday - or even,
by extension, the days of every week leading up to the Sundays,
from Wednesday evening onwards. The bishops were probably
pushing their luck by that stage; but they achieved much in a
violent age and they created some structure and rules of conduct
where there had been none. These are the origins of
humanitarian laws in time of war. They are still around in the
United Nations and in courts such as at the Nuremberg Trials.
The peace of God movement was one remarkable new
development of the idea in Galatians that in Christ there was
neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free - at least within the society
of Christians. And just as the peace movement developed,
another symbol of Christian unity in the West was taking
powerful shape, a symbol which endures within the Christian
world to this day. One bishop built on the ancient prestige of his
diocese in Rome to act as a focus for unity in western society.
The culmination of this new universality in the twelfth century
was a claim by the Popes in Rome to universal monarchy. It was
a claim which it must be said was never accepted by the
churches of the East. Even in the West it proved impossible to
turn the claim into reality, in the face of the suspicions of secular
rulers, especially because of hostility from a rival symbol of
western unity, the Holy Roman Emperor.
~everthel'ess the medieval Western Church produced an
overarching framework of thinking and institutions which for
centuries successfully transcended cultural and linguistic

identities. From the twelfth century, when the papal claim to
universal monarchy was formalized, the papacy built up a code
of universal law, canon law, which was administered in church
courts throughout Europe, and which was remarkably successful
in shaping and regulating western society. Just as successful was
the idea of unity which survived even the murderous disputes
between the popes and the Holy Roman Emperors. It was an idea
which was given plausibility by the use of the universal
language, Latin, by the foundation of international religious
orders, and more regrettably in our eyes, by the military
campaigns of the Crusades against non-Christians. Anyone who
is sensitive to the style of Romanesque and Gothic church
buildings from the Shetlands to the Holy Land will perceive the
cultural unity of this world.
4-+':1
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Because of all this, the medieval West was indeed a single
society, a res~ublicaChristiana. This phrase could be translated
a "Christian commonwealth" or simply as "Christendom". It was
" an idea which owed as much to the Roman Empire as to
Christianity and this fact was increasingly obvious because
alongside canon laws, the law of the old empire was revived as
civil law. This was not a dead legal code; it grew alongside
canon law as a standard for regulating the lives of people within
the Christian commonwealth, even providing guidelines for their
relationships with non-Christians, just as the imperial law-code
had done. It was the first system of international law. With two
such powerful sources, Christ and the Roman Empire, the idea
of a universal society has had an enduring fascination for Europe
- and so for America. Perhaps the most striking symbol of this
Christian society with a common purpose was the moment in
1494 when the then Pope, Alexander VI, acted as a referee
between the Spanish and Portuguese Monarchies and allotted to
them separated spheres of influence in the new lands which they
were discovering outside Europe in Africa and America. We do
not need to approve of what 'Alexander did to see the
significance of it.

c
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Yet this was just the moment when the structures of the
medieval respublica Christiana were fatally fractured. Partly it
was that individual monarchies were getting too powerful to set
much store by the idea of a universal society which would
constrain them. Their relationships were increasingly governed
by expediency, without much consideration for the special
character of Christendom. The King of France, whose title was
"the most Christian King", allied with the Ottoman Turks
against his hated Christian enemy the Holy Roman Emperor.
One of the images of this mood which has struck me forcibly
recently is the cover illustration of a new history of the Knights
of Malta: one of the military orders set up specially to defend
medieval Christendom against Islam. The picture is the
reproduction of a miniature showing Prince Zizim, brother of the
Ottoman Sultan, being feasted by the Knights in their then
headquarters on the island of Rhodes. They had granted him
asylum against his brother; so here were the brethren of
organizations sworn to fight the infidel, who had chosen to ally
with one infidel against another to further their long-term aims.
The realism of Macchiavelli was transforming the chivalric ideal
of the Middle Ages. There could be no more telling symbol of
the new atmosphere in which Renaissance power politicians
operated, and the Church was drawn in like everyone else.
But the fatal blow to the ideal of Christendom was dealt by the
Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. Half of Europe
rejected the idea that the Pope had a special role in God's plan.
As the official statement of faith of my own Church put it in
1563, "The Bishop of Rome hath no jurisdiction in this realm of
England". This was not a rejection of the link between church
and political power which had begun in the Roman Empire.
Quite the contrary; secular monarchs seized control of the
Church from the Pope for themselves, and in practice there was
very little difference in the political position of Protestant or
Catholic rulers. Whether rulers were Catholic or Protestant, they
all affirmed the identification of the Church with the whole of
society. They persecuted radical Christians of that time who
went back to the foundation documents of Christianity and tried
10
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to separate Christianity completely from politics. Once
monarchs had rejected the Pope's universal authority, there was
no limit on the power of individual political units. Even the Pope
went quiet about the idea of his universal monarchy during the
seventeenth century. The concept of the sovereign state became
dominant: it banished the medieval idea of a universal society to
the margins. The sovereign state is still with us.
Most of these sovereign states started as family businesses; that
is they were multi-national entities, representing the power of a
royal or imperial dynasty rather than an individual grouping of a.
national language. Many of them therefore borrowed the
classical and medieval word for a power with no superior
supreme over several peoples, and called themselves empires;
their model was the so-called Holy Roman Empire, by then itself
a family business of the Hapsburg dynasty. During the
seventeenth century most states also took on a single official
version of Christian identity, after a series of hideously
destructive confessional wars. However, some of these dynastic
sovereign states could and did make a further and very
significant identification. They allied with a particular language
grouping, something which had rarely been a decisive factor in
the politics of medieval Europe. This was beginning to happen
in France during the seventeenth century; then the French
Revolution and its aftermath would give renewed power to the
alliance between power-structure and language-grouping.
The ideology of the French Revolution, exported throughout
Europe, was that the state was the people in arms. Naturally this
was most persuasive an image where the people could all
understand each other's language. The classic case of such a
success in nation-state building in the nineteenth century is Italy,
but it is instructive to see how much myth-making was necessary
even for this text-book example: a single modern Italian
language was virtually created alongside the many regional
versions of Italian, in order to make the Italian nation-state
plausible. Such a sovereign nation-state claimed an intimate
relationship with its people's identity. In the aftermath of the

First World War, the victorious allies did their best to create yet
more nation-states on the ruins of the dynastic states which had
fought themselves to destruction. President Woodrow Wilson
had the idea that self-determination was founded upon the
nineteenth century liberal idea that humanity was naturally
divided into nations, and that every nations should have its own
state. It is arguable that this notion has cost as many lives as the
ideology of Stalin. It redowns to the credit of Robert Lansing,
Wilson's Secretary of State, that he said this at the time; "The
more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of
self-determination, the more convinced I am of the danger of
putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to
the basis of impossible demands. What effect will it have on the
Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and the nationalists among the
Boers? Will it not breed rebellion? The phrase is simply loaded
with dynamite. It will raise hopes that can never be realized. It
will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to be
discredited, to be the called the dream of an idealist... What a
calamity that the phrase was ever uttered."
In 1918 one fatally unresolved question was whether the nationstate existed to serve its people, or the people to serve the
nation-state. Democrats give one answer, authoritarian, Fascists
and Stalinists another. Out of this confusion came the awful
events of the Second World War.

!C.!

So it was in those chaotic months of 1945, that I found myself
involved in a further piece of tidying-up of these nation-states on
the borders of Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia. Even at the time,
we all agreed that the neatest solution would have been to
restore the Austro-Hungarian empire after its quarter-century of
oblivion. At least the recreation of a Hapsburg dynastic state
would have left all nationalities equally and impartially
discontented. The official title of one of the countries whose
borders I was trying to define was "the Kingdom of the Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes", which revealed what a strangely-mixed
potion such a nation-state as Yugoslavia could be. As we now

realize, there was much more and much less to so-called
Yugoslavia than that.
Now we live with the consequences of these two centuries of
western obsession with the nation-state. We have even exported
the beast to the former colonies of the European empires in what
is sometimes called the developing world. Virtually none of the
boundaries of these former colonies have been altered after
independence, although seldom did these boundaries have much
meaning before Europeans arrived. It is hardly surprising if
some of these states seem to have ceased to have any meaningful
existence. In Rwanda and Burundi, an arbitrary status division
encouraged by the colonial power has been turned into a quite
spurious nationality division, so that Tutsi and Hutu extremists
battle to wipe each other out to construct a single pure nation
state, a lunatic version of the myth of nineteenth century Italy.
Even Christian leaders in those unhappy countries have been
trained by this madness, and the Church has been split on ethnic
lines which take little account of theology.
We must also recognize how often religion has made such
situations worse by adding a dimension of antiquity to identities
which became national in the nineteenth century model. The
problems in Yugoslavia, in the Middle East and in Northern
Ireland arise from the association of religion with national
identity. They are inherently difficult of compromise precisely
because of the religious dimension, especially for those, like
Jews, Christians and Muslims, who claim to worship one God. A
monotheist can be bilingual; a monotheist can perhaps be
binational. But a monotheist cannot be bireligious.
..
What is worse is that even our modem-day revival of an
international commonwealth or resvublica, the United Nations,
is still shackled to the nation-state as its very name reveals. So
was its unhappy predecessor, the significantly-named League of
Nations. Behind these organizations are the ghosts of older,
.universalist ideals quite incompatible with the nation-state: the
Roman Empire, the internationalism of civil and canon law, the
.
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There is a phrase now so much used in some Christian circles
that it has become a clich6, but that is not to say that it is beyond
usefulness. It is that of "the wounded healer". Yes, physicians
must heal themselves, but they may inspire more trust in their
patients if they have the honesty to admit their own obvious
wounds. One of the most heartening features of the twentieth
century has been the growth of ecurnenism in the Christian
Church. The ecumenical movement has had many
disappointments, but one cannot expect the wounds of nineteen
centuries to be bound up in a single century. One of the
achievements of ecumenism has been to release Christian
historians from their confessional shackles, to begin examining
those ancient wounds afresh. To undertake this effort of
examination or reconsideration is to take the past seriously, not
to forget it. Remember my Serbian bishop: with his centuries of
bitter memories, he cried to me, the Western liberal, "Why do
you not understand?" No body is more dangerous for peace than
those who say "Forget the past." No one is more helpful than
those who say "We must heal the past."
The search for healing in understanding our past will inevitably
lead us to finding what is wrong in our own past. I have not
spared the Christian Church in this survey of its relations with
states. It has betrayed its supposed universality from an early
date. It has allied with the powerful, and given sacred
legitimation for long periods of time to a whole variety of human
institutions, including slavery. Western Christians have tried,
and failed, to establish their own universal monarchy on the
basis of the bishopric of Rome. You will have noted that the
modern nation-state is an outgrowth of Western Christian
society, yet this nation-state has now spread throughout the
modern world and has put in a claim to being indispensable,
whatever the cultural setting. Perhaps it is time for Christian
churches to recall nation-states to their origins, and to give them
a sense of their own contingency, even their temporary place
amid human organization.

wrecked the richness and variety of that country. In South
Africa, Nelson Mandela in the hour of victory turned away from
the opportunity to settle old scores with oppressors, and has won
the gratitude of those who formerly sought to crush their
opponents by terror. In neither case has the past been forgotten.
It has been faced, and then forgiveness has begun.
The ultimate human act of humility is to apologize. That is the
clear-eyed recognition of a wrong done to another: a wound
inflicted which will remain a wound until it is acknowledged.
This is something which the Christian church in an ecumenical
century can offer with a clear conscience to the world as an
example. The Western Church has begun, for instance to see the
horror of its record in relation to Judaism. Pope John XXIII
removed passages about the conversion of the Jews from prayers
in the Roman Catholic liturgy, and the present Pope has also
spelled out his Church's consciousness of its responsibility for
past miseries. Indeed, the pontificate of Pope John Paul I1 has
been notable for its apologies. Here is the successor of the
would-be universal monarchs of the Middle Ages, head of a
Church which for many still seems over-authoritarian in many of
its attitudes; yet he is prepared to admit ancient mistakes. Pope
John Paul has sought to make amends for the Church's past
attitude to women. He has even issued a statement of regret for
the Church's treatment of the great scientist Galileo, one of the
worst blunders in Christian history. In Spain, the Roman
Catholic Church hierarchy has begun facing up to its role in a
civil war which divided Spanish society and brought half a
century of hatred and oppression.
Apologies can bring rich fruits. We have seen in Europe the
remarkable effect produced by the statesmanlike apologies made
by successive German Presidents, von Weiszacker, and Herzog,
for Cierman actions in the Second World War. At the root of this
series of acts of atonement was the moving sight of that great
German statesman, Willy Brandt, kneeling before the Warsaw
Ghetto. On the other side of the same conflicts, we have heard
President Vaclav Have1 express sorrow for the expulsion of

